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Epsilon – Keep Calm and Carry On

There’s been a lot of media coverage and online discussion about the Epsilon data breach, and how it should be a big wake-up call to email recipients to change their behavior.
There’s also been a lot of panic and finger-pointing within the email industry about What Must Be Done In The Future. Most of the “you must do X in response to the data loss” suggestions are coming from the same people and groups who’ve been saying “you must do X” for years, and are just trying to grab the coattails of the publicity about this particular incident, though.
Not many people seem to be talking honestly about what this will really mean to an individual recipient whose email address Epsilon lost, though. I’m going to try to answer some questions I’ve seen asked realistically, rather than with an eye to forwarding an agenda.
1. Who are Epsilon?
Epsilon are an Email Service Provider, or ESP. That means that they handle sending email on behalf of other companies. If you’re on a company’s mailing list – you’re getting regular newsletters or special offers or any sort of email advertising – the odds are very good that the company isn’t sending you that email themselves. Instead they’re probably contracting with one of hundreds of ESPs to send the email for them. This is a good thing, as sending email to a lot of people “properly” such that it’s delivered to them in a timely fashion, it’s sent only to people who want it and so on is quite difficult to do well and any ESP you choose is likely to be better at it than a typical company trying to start sending that bulk mail themselves.
2. What happened at Epsilon?
The what is pretty simple – somebody stole a list of names and email addresses of people who were being sent email via Epsilon. Nobody outside of Epsilon and law enforcement really know the details of how it was done, though lots of people are speculating about it.
3. Is this identity theft? Do I need to check my credit rating and so on?
No, it’s not something that’s going to lead to identity theft. All that was stolen was your name, your email address and some of the companies who send you email. Your postal address, credit card numbers, social security numbers and so on aren’t at risk, even if you’ve given those to the companies who are sending you email. The only information those companies passed to Epsilon were your name and email address, nothing more, so that’s all that was stolen.
4. Is this common?
Yes, it happens all the time. I use tagged email addresses when I give them to a company, and I’ve done so fairly consistently for the better part of two decades. That lets me track when email addresses are leaked, by who and to whom. Email addresses you give to a company leak to spammers all the time. That’s true for huge companies, tiny one-woman companies, tech-savvy companies, everyone.
5. How do email addresses leak from companies to spammers?
There are a lot of ways

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Real. Or. Phish? Part 2

Steve mentioned the email he received yesterday from one of the companies that was compromised by the Epsilon attack and how difficult it was to determine if this was a real email from Marriott or a phish.
It’s not just over email where the companies are doing badly. Citibank appears to be attempting to notify me about the breach, but are doing it in a way that is indistinguishable from someone trying to get me to give them my banking information.
This morning I received a recorded message purporting to be from Citibank.
The number they’re calling from appears to belong to an outsourced debt collector. Some of the links I’ve found online indicate this is a valid number used by Citibank to collect debts. It’s not unreasonable they’d use current contractors or employees to make calls.
But, if I was a phisher trying to use the compromised data, I’d make sure my outgoing caller ID actually looked like a number Citi calls from. This might be real or it might not.
The message alerted me to a “problem with my credit card” and asked me to call a 866 number as soon as was convenient for me. The problem is that the number they asked me to call is not listed anywhere as belonging to Citibank. It’s not on their website nor not on the back of my credit card. This is suspicious at best, and anyone with any sense will not call that number, instead calling a number Citi publishes as belonging to them.
I could also visit a website to get more information. This site is different
from the website I use to do online banking but does redirect to what appears to be a valid Citibank website, complete with SSL certificate. This is better than an unrelated phone number.
About 30 minutes later I received a second phone call from the same Irving, TX phone number. This time someone was on the other end. She asked for Steve. As I normally do when I get a call on my phone for Steve I asked her what it was about.
She told me that it was about our credit card and she needed to talk to him.
I informed her we had been informed by our bank that our personal information had been compromised and that we would not be discussing anything related to banking over the phone. I also said if they needed to contact us they could use the physical address on the account.
Then the caller asks, “Are you his wife?” I explained, again, that I was not going to answer any questions and that all requests should be sent to us by mail.
“But I need to know so I can stop you from being called!” she says. This is exactly the kind of thing someone who was trying to social engineer information from us would say. I repeated my statement of not wanting to talk to anyone about our financial information and hung up.
The thing is, I really do actually think this was a legitimate call from Citi attempting to protect us. But, as with many things banks do, they are encouraging poor security on the part of the consumer. They’re sending me to a short website, which is similar to a what phishers do. They’re calling from random numbers, which is what phishers might do. They’re calling and asking for information over the phone, which is very bad. They’re training users to compromise security information.
Other people have received the Citi call, and have noticed how Citi is training customers to be victims.

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Real. Or. Phish?

After Epsilon lost a bunch of customer lists last week, I’ve been keeping an eye open to see if any of the vendors I work with had any of my email addresses stolen – not least because it’ll be interesting to see where this data ends up.
Yesterday I got mail from Marriott, telling me that “unauthorized third party gained access to a number of Epsilon’s accounts including Marriott’s email list.”. Great! Lets start looking for spam to my Marriott tagged address, or for phishing targeted at Marriott customers.
I hit what looks like paydirt this morning. Plausible looking mail with Marriott branding, nothing specific to me other than name and (tagged) email address.
It’s time to play Real. Or. Phish?
1. Branding and spelling is all good. It’s using decent stock photos, and what looks like a real Marriott logo.
All very easy to fake, but if it’s a phish it’s pretty well done. Then again, phishes often steal real content and just change out the links.
Conclusion? Real. Maybe.
2. The mail wasn’t sent from marriott.com, or any domain related to it. Instead, it came from “Marriott@marriott-email.com”.
This is classic phish behaviour – using a lookalike domain such as “paypal-billing.com” or “aolsecurity.com” so as to look as though you’re associated with a company, yet to be able to use a domain name you have full control of, so as to be able to host websites, receive email, sign with DKIM, all that sort of thing.
Conclusion? Phish.
3. SPF pass
Given that the mail was sent “from” marriott-email.com, and not from marriott.com, this is pretty meaningless. But it did pass an SPF check.
Conclusion? Neutral.
4. DKIM fail
Authentication-Results: m.wordtothewise.com; dkim=fail (verification failed; insecure key) header.i=@marriott-email.com;
As the mail was sent “from” marriott-email.com it should have been possible for the owner of that domain (presumably the phisher) to sign it with DKIM. That they didn’t isn’t a good sign at all.
Conclusion? Phish.
5. Badly obfuscated headers
From: =?iso-8859-1?B?TWFycmlvdHQgUmV3YXJkcw==?= <Marriott@marriott-email.com>
Subject: =?iso-8859-1?B?WW91ciBBY2NvdW50IJYgVXAgdG8gJDEwMCBjb3Vwb24=?=
Base 64 encoding of headers is an old spammer trick used to make them more difficult for naive spam filters to handle. That doesn’t work well with more modern spam filters, but spammers and phishers still tend to do it so as to make it harder for abuse desks to read the content of phishes forwarded to them with complaints. There’s no legitimate reason to encode plain ascii fields in this way. Spamassassin didn’t like the message because of this.
Conclusion? Phish.
6. Well-crafted multipart/alternative mail, with valid, well-encoded (quoted-printable) plain text and html parts
Just like the branding and spelling, this is very well done for a phish. But again, it’s commonly something that’s stolen from legitimate email and modified slightly.
Conclusion? Real, probably.
7. Typical content links in the email
Most of the content links in the email are to things like “http://marriott-email.com/16433acf1layfousiaey2oniaaaaaalfqkc4qmz76deyaaaaa”, which is consistent with the from address, at least. This isn’t the sort of URL a real company website tends to use, but it’s not that unusual for click tracking software to do something like this.
Conclusion? Neutral
8. Atypical content links in the email
We also have other links:

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The weakest link

Last week there was a rather detailed post on the attack at RSA. It is well worth a read because I think many of the techniques employed in the RSA attacks have been or will be employed against ESPs.
Early in the article, the author asks a question.

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Time for a real security response

I’ve seen a number of people and blogs address the recent breaches at some large ESPs make recommendations on how to fix things. Most of them are so far from right they’re not even wrong.
One group is pointing at consumers and insisting consumers be taught to secure their machines. But consumers weren’t compromised here.
Another group is pointing to senders and insisting senders start authenticating all their email. But the failure wasn’t in authentication and some of the mail is coming through the ESP systems and is authenticated.
Still others are claiming that ISPs need to step up their filtering. But the problem wasn’t with the ISPs letting too much email through.
The other thing that’s been interesting is to watch groups jump on this issue to promote their pet best practices. DKIM proponents are insisting everyone sign email with DKIM. Extended SSL proponents are insisting everyone use extended SSL. But the problem wasn’t with unsigned email or website trust.
All of these solutions fail to address the underlying issue:
ESPs do not have sufficient security in place to prevent hackers from getting into their systems and stealing their customers’ data.
ESPs must address real security issues. Not security issues with sending mail, but restricting the ability of hackers to get into their systems. This includes employee training as well as hardening of systems. These are valuable databases that can be compromised by getting someone inside support to click on a phish link.
Not everyone inside an ESP needs access to address lists. Not everyone inside an ESP customer needs full access to address lists. ESPs must implement controls on who can touch, modify, or download address lists.  These controls must address technical attacks, spear phishing attacks and social engineering attacks.
What’s happening here actually looks a lot like the Comodo certificate attack or the RSA compromise.
It’s time for the ESP industry to step up and start taking system security seriously.

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Targeted attacks via email – phishing for WoW gold

You’re going to be seeing a lot of discussion about email addresses stolen from ESPs in the next few days, if you haven’t already. There are a lot of interesting things to discuss about that from an email perspective – from “Why two factor authentication isn’t a magic bullet.” to “And this is why corporate spam folders can be a major security risk.”
We could have fodder for blog content for weeks!
Right now I’m just going to look at one of the reasons why it’s worth stealing a list of email addresses from an ESP or a list owner, rather than just gathering them from other sources. That is, why the ESPs and list owners are high value targets beyond just “that’s where the email addresses are“.
If you steal a list of addresses from a list owner, or a bunch of lists from an ESP, you have one very useful extra piece of information about the recipients beyond the usual name-and-email-address. You know a company that the recipient is already expecting to receive email from.
That means that you know someone you can pretend to be in order to get a recipient to open and respond to a malicious email you send them – which will make an attempt to phish someones credentials or compromise their computer via email much more likely to be effective.
A good example of targeted phishing for credentials is the online game World of Warcraft. There’s a huge criminal underground that makes real world money by selling game money to players. The main thing the gold sellers need to have to be able to acquire game money, advertise their services to players and to give game money to players in return for dollars is an endless series of World of Warcraft accounts. Blizzard, the World of Warcraft owner, work reasonably hard to squash those accounts and make it slightly tricky for the gold sellers to sign up for them, so stealing account credentials from existing users is a great way to get them. And you can also strip those accounts bare of in-game possessions and gold in the process.
Some of the phishing is done in the game itself, where you know that everyone has an account you can steal if you can just get them to visit your website and compromise their machine…

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Happy April Fools!

There’s nothing useful I can post on April the first. Plus, it’s sunny and 85 here and, I’m about to declare it the weekend.
So I leave you with a picture of what I Can Haz Cheezburger thinks of our business.

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Authentication and phishing

Yahoo announced today that they are releasing the Yahoo! Mail Anti-Phishing Platform (YMAP) that will help protect their users from phishing. They have a similar project in place for eBay and PayPal mail, but this will extend to a broader range of companies.

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Does your unsubscribe process work? Are you sure?

I stumbled across an interesting problem today.
A company I bought something from a while back added me to their newsletter. They seem to be having trouble making sales this quarter, as they’ve gone from an occasional email every few weeks to bombarding me with increasingly desperate offers in the past week or two. So I do what most recipients do in that situation (well, the ones who don’t just mark the mail as spam, anyway). I click the unsubscribe link.
I get a perfectly normal, standard unsubscription page, with a nice, prominent “Unsubscribe from all” button with good text explaining that that will remove me from all of the companies mailing lists. No requirements to log in, set dozens of checkboxes or provide a password I don’t have. So far this is a textbook example of a good unsubscription process.
I click the button. Nothing happens. That’s not good.
So I grab one of the people I know over at that ESP and we start looking at it. He clicks the button, and it loads a new page saying that I’ve been unsubscribed from all of the companies mailing lists.
A bit more testing shows that the unsubscription works if you use Internet Explorer or Firefox, but not if you use Safari. The cause of the bug was threefold:

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Just give it up already

I have a mail system totally separate from my inbox to use when I’m testing signup forms. Some of them are client, some of them are vendors my clients are thinking about using. In any case, it’s mail I’m seriously concerned won’t stop just by me opting out of it.
The server hosting that mail system has been flakey lately, and needs to be hard power cycled to make it come back. We had a major power glitch this morning and so ended up down at the colo and power cycled that box while we were there.
This box was last working February 4th. It’s been off the internet for almost 2 months now. It wasn’t answering on port 25. It was dead. No mail here. And, yet, a bunch of legitimate email marketers are still attempting to send those addresses mail.
Really. Dead for 2 months and the senders keep trying to mail to those addresses. The server came back about 2 1/2 hours ago. I already have 6 emails from two different senders.
Seriously. If you can’t deliver a mail to someone for TWO MONTHS just give it up already. I am sad that even companies that get the best advice I can give them still can’t get the simple things right.
And, really, don’t argue “but it came back! Clearly we should keep trying!” Yes, it came back. But in all the years I’ve had this disposable email system I have not opened a single image. I’ve not purchased a single thing. I’ve never shown any sign of life on any of those addresses. The mailserver has been down for months at a time. There is no value to continuing to send mail to those addresses. And, yet, people still do it.
Why? WHY!?

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