People are the weakest link

All of the technical security in the world won’t fix the biggest security problem: people. Let’s face it, we are the weakest link. Adding more security doesn’t work, it only causes people to figure out ways to get around the security.

The more secure you make something, the less secure it becomes. Why? Because when security gets in the way, sensible, well-meaning, dedicated people develop hacks and workarounds that defeat the security. Don Norman

This isn’t news to anyone in the security space. Even those of us who are reasonably aware of security issues can still have problems. A few weeks ago I clicked on a phishing link. It was a delivery notification. I’d just ordered something online. It looked plausible. I clicked the link. Lucky for me there wasn’t drive-by malware on the site.
A few years ago, there were a number of email people arguing that two factor authentication (2FA) would fix the security problems. Steve wrote a couple blog posts here explaining why that was unlikely. (Defending against the hackers of 1995, What is Two Factor Authentication, Two Factor Authentication)

What is two factor authentication?

The older blog posts talk about 2FA, but a quick review for folks. 2FA requires two separate factors to identify a user. Many people describe this as “something you know and something you have.” A user might know their password and have access to a phone that will receive a SMS one time code.  Many online services currently offer two factor authentication. Google even provides an authenticator app people can run on their cell phone. Companies that want to offer 2FA using that app can. I set up 2FA for a service over the weekend – it was as simple as taking a picture of a QR code and typing the resulting number into the website.

What’s the problem?

The problem is that it is possible to subvert 2FA. Back in 2011 attackers hacked one of the major 2FA vendors and stole the master keys. A little while later, some government contractors reported attempts to break in potentially using this information.
Now we’re using multiple forms of 2FA, so it’s more secure, right? No.
TechBeacon has a recent article looking at some of the ways that 2FA has been compromised. Most of these involve a human making a decision and taking an action to subvert security through different channels.
For me, one of the most interesting links is a blog post from Justin Williams earlier this month. His cellphone number was transferred, against corporate policy, to another phone. The hacker then used the 2FA to transfer money out of his PayPal account.  This situation is why I cringe when I hear about a service rep bypassing policy to help out a user. Every time this turns out OK it’s great. But it’s also training customer support that it’s OK to make exceptions. No, it’s not. Even when it’s the saddest sob story you’ve ever heard.

Companies train users to be victims

Also this month a health insurance company sent a USB stick to users. The accompanying letter instructed users to plug the web key into their computer. No. Just No. This is training users to be victims when some attacker decides to do the same thing.
Marketers are another big part of the problem with training users to be victims. I wrote about this almost exactly a year ago in Working around email security. Steve walked through how many banks and retailers use cousin domains earlier this year. I saw another example just recently, prompting me to create a meme to share on Facebook.

Security and usability

For many years, there was a belief that security and usability were contradictory. Increasing security leads to less usability. There is certainly some of that in play still. But I think many of us in the email marketing space need to start thinking a little more about security. We are responsible for presenting our brand in the inbox world. Do we want to train our users that every email comes from a different domain? All the authentication and DMARC policies in the world won’t protect us from cousin domains. Marketers that use cousin domains are setting their brands and consumers up for failure.
A brand that is consistent in its sending and authentication not only develops good reputation for delivery, they also help innoculate users against attacks by third parties. Marketing departments can take the lead in creating a more secure environment online. Building security into messaging streams is more than just technical authentication, it’s about the whole message and domains and consistency. Every marketer needs to think about how they’re presenting their brand. How many different domains are you using in your marketing campaigns? How easy would it be for a bad guy to register a similar one?
Don’t set your users up for failure.

Related Posts

DMARC doesn't fix Phishing

Not a new thing, but a nice example just popped up in my inbox on my phone.

 
But FedEx solved their entire phishing problem when they published a strict p=reject DMARC record, right?
This didn’t come from fedex.com. It came from another domain that looks vaguely like fedex.com – what that domain is doesn’t matter, as the domain it’s sent from isn’t displayed to the user on my phone mail client. Nor is it displayed to the user by Mail.app on my desktop, unless you turn off Mail → Preferences … → Viewing → Use Smart Addresses.

That lookalike domain could pass SPF, it could be used as d= in DKIM signing, it could even be set up with DMARC p=reject. And the mail is pixel identical to real mail from fedex.com.
On my desktop client I can hover over the link and notice it looks suspicious – but it’s no more suspicious looking than a typical ESP link-tracking URL. And on mobile I don’t even get to do that.
SPF and DKIM and DMARC can temporarily inconvenience phishers to the extent that they have to change the domain they’re sending from, but it’ll have no effect on the vulnerability of most of your audience to being phished using your brand.

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Are you (accidentally) supporting phishing

One of the themes in some of my recent talks has been how some marketers teach their customers to become victims of phishing. Typically I’m talking about how companies register domains “just for email” and then use those for bulk messages. If customers get used to mail from company.ESP.com and companyemail.com they’re going to believe that company-email.com is also you.
There are other ways to train your customers to be phishing victims, too. Zeltzer security walks us through a couple emails that look so much like phishing that it fooled company representatives. Go take a read, they give a number of examples of both good and bad emails.
biohazardmail
I was a little frustrated that the examples don’t include headers so we could look at the authentication. But the reality is only a teeny, tiny fraction of folks even know how to check headers. They’re not very useful for the average user.
Security is something we should never forget. As more and more online accounts are tied to our email addresses those of us who market to email addresses need to think about what we’re teaching our recipients about our company. DMARC and other authentication technologies can help secure email, but marketers also need to pay attention to how they are communicating with recipients.

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