Security, safety and the cavalry

In some ways it’s been really hard to focus on email for the last few months. There are so many more important issues in the world. Terrorism, Brexit, the US elections compromised by a foreign government, nuclear threats from multiple countries, the repeal of ACA, mass deportations and ICE raids here in the US.  I find myself thinking about what to blog. Then I glance at the news and wonder if there’s any value in another blog post about deliverability.
Generally I’ve tried to keep politics and world events mostly off the blog. But sometimes events are such that I need to talk about them.
Last October I had the chance to speak at the Email Innovations Summit in London. Steve and I took the chance to spend some time doing tourist things in London – including a photo walk along the Thames.

As an American I’m always a little surprised by the security in London. I grew up a few miles outside of DC. I could talk about prohibited airspace and security measures before I was 10. London is so much more open than even the DC of my youth. The surprise there is that London has been a much bigger target and attacked more than any city in the US.
The last few times we were in London I noticed a bit more visible security. In 2013 it was armed security walking through Tube stations. Last year it was Underground trains that were one long car. They were a bit weird and visually disconcerting. The part that really made me think, though, was this was a way to stop people hiding explosives between cars and to facilitate evacuations if something happened.
Last night Steve and I were talking and I mentioned the attack in London didn’t seem like terrorism to me. And it didn’t, not really. He then pointed out that explosives and guns are difficult to come by in the UK and this was classic terrorism. Oh. Sometimes our cultural differences come out in the strangest places.
Thinking about bigger issues like this make it hard to focus on email. There’s a regularly shared joke in deliverability, “There’s no such thing as a deliverability emergency.” And there isn’t, not really. Yes, even if a whole range of IPs is listed on Spamhaus, it’s still not an emergency and there’s no fast response team to deal with it.
There are abuse issues that are higher stakes than getting to the inbox. Child abuse materials. Harassment. Privacy issues. Terror threats. Every online services company, particularly the social media companies, have to deal with these kinds of things. Many of them are dealing poorly. Others have employees who are doing their best, but lack the tools, support, and training to do it well. Many companies don’t understand why they need to police their customer base.
The reality is, though, that abuse on the net (as opposed to abuse of the net) is a huge issue that needs to be dealt with. These are not small issues. The Internet is global and there’s no internet police. Law enforcement in different jurisdictions have to work together with technology experts to address crime and harassment on the internet.
It may surprise you to hear that the people who create spam filters and try and protect your inbox are the same people who fight crime on the internet. Spam and email are a vital part of online crime, so it falls on the abuse team to work with and educate law enforcement about tracing the source of email. The people you never see in ops, and abuse and support are vital to protecting folks online.
During the closing talk at MAAWG the chair was discussing how we can protect our online spaces. He stated “There is no cavalry; no second wave. It’s us or no one.” That’s a huge thing. My friends and colleagues are the people who stand protecting users online. It feels like a huge burden, but it’s something we can do to make the world a better and safer place.
 
 

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From the archives: Taking Permission

From February 2010, Taking Permission.

Permission is always a hot topic in email marketing. Permission is key! the experts tell us. Get permission to send email! the ISPs tell us.
Marketers have responded by setting up processes to “get” permission from recipients before adding them to mailing lists. They point to their privacy polices and signup forms and say “Look! the recipient gave us permission.”
In many cases, though, the permission isn’t given to the sender, permission is taken from the recipient.
Yes, permission is being TAKEN by the sender. At the point of address collection many senders set the default to be the recipient gets mail. These processes take any notion of giving permission out of the equation. The recipient doesn’t have to give permission, permission is assumed.
This isn’t real permission. No process that requires the user to take action to stop themselves from being opted in is real permission. A default state of yes takes the actual opt-in step away from the recipient.
Permission just isn’t about saying “well, we told the user if they gave us an email address we’d send them mail and they gave us an email address anyway.” Permission is about giving the recipients a choice in what they want to receive. All too often senders take permission from recipients instead of asking for permission to be given.
Since that post was originally written, some things have changed.
CASL has come into effect. CASL prevents marketers from taking permission as egregiously as what prompted this post. Under CASL, pre-checked opt-in boxes do not count as explicit permission. The law does have a category of implicit permission, which consists of an active consumer / vendor relationship. This implicit permission is limited in scope and senders have to stop mailing 2 years after the last activity.
The other change is in Gmail filters. Whatever they’re doing these days seems to really pick out mail that doesn’t have great permission. Business models that would work a few years ago are now struggling to get to the inbox at Gmail. Many of these are non-relationship emails – one off confirmations, tickets, receipts. There isn’t much of a relationship between the sender and the recipient, so the filters are biased against the mail.
Permission is still key, but these days I’m not sure even informed permission is enough.

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Happy New Year!

Well, we mostly survived 2016. A year ago I was making predictions about how 2016 would be the year of email security. I was thinking of things like TLS and authentication and access to the inbox. It wasn’t out of the question, Gmail said they’d be turning on p=reject sometime mid-year. They also were suggesting that they would be putting more value on messages that aligned, even in the absence of a DMARC signature. The first still hasn’t happened, and the second doesn’t appear to be in place, either.
DataSecurity_Illustration
That doesn’t mean email security wasn’t a hot topic in 2016. In fact, the use of a private email server was a major topic during the US elections. We also had spear-phishing play a major role in the compromise of campaign systems. I didn’t talk much about that here when it happened, but news reports make it clear that Chairman Podesta and others were targeted for compromise. The NY Times has a more in depth article with broader context around the attacks and how emails were used to infiltrate a major political party.
The irony is with all the time spent talking about how insecure the private server was, that server wasn’t compromised. Instead, the compromise was at Gmail.
We all need to pay attention to our email and how we use it. It also means when we’re sending bulk and marketing email we need to consider the private and personal information we’re putting in messages. Do you send PII? Is there a way you don’t have to? What can we do to protect our brand and our users?
It’s not just bulk email we need to think about, either. Personal email can contain PII, or personal information. A common saying among some of my security friends is “never put in email anything you wouldn’t want to see on the front page of the Washington Post or NY Times.” That’s an easy thing to say, but the convenience of email makes it easy to share information that we may not want on the front page of either paper. Many of us aren’t actually targets of malicious activity so we don’t have to worry about being targeted the way elected and other officials are. But that doesn’t mean we are not at risk. It just means we’re at less risk than others.
Email is a frequent vector for malicious actors to access computers. Most, if not all of the major breeches in the last few years have started with a phishing attack of some sort. The attacks are planned out and sophisticated. This is not going to get better. The phishers are smart and plan the attacks.  We also need to be more personally aware of security given the current political climate. We need to take steps to protect ourselves more than we have in the past.
Security is more important than ever and we all need to protect ourselves.

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It's not fair

In the delivery space, stuff comes in cycles. We’re currently in a cycle where people are unhappy with spam filters. There are two reasons they’re unhappy: false positives and false negatives.
False positives are emails that the user doesn’t think is spam but goes into the bulk folder anyway.
Fales negatives are emails that the user does thing is spam but is delivered to the inbox.
I’ve sat on multiple calls over the course of my career, with clients and potential clients, where the question I cannot answer comes up. “Why do I still get spam?”
I have a lot of thoughts about this question and what it means for a discussion, how it should be answered and what the next steps are. But it’s important to understand that I, and most of my deliverability colleagues, hate this question. Yet we get it all the time. ISPs get it, too.
A big part of the answer is because spammers spend inordinate amounts of time and money trying to figure out how to break filters. In fact, back in 2006 the FTC fined a company almost a million dollars for using deceptive techniques to try and get into filters. One of the things this company did would be to have folks manually create emails to test filters. Once they found a piece of text that would get into the inbox, they’d spam until the filters caught up. Then, they’d start testing content again to see what would get past the filters. Repeat.
This wasn’t some fly by night company. They had beautiful offices in San Francisco with conference rooms overlooking Treasure Island. They were profitable. They were spammers. Of course, not long after the FTC fined them, they filed bankruptcy and disappeared.
Other spammers create and cultivate vast networks of IP addresses and domains to be used in snowshoeing operations. Still other spammers create criminal acts to hijack reputation of legitimate senders to make it to the inbox.
Why do you still get spam? That’s a bit like asking why people speed or run red lights. You still get spam because spammers invest a lot of money and time into sending you spam. They’re OK with only a small percentage of emails getting through filters, they’ll just make it up in volume.
Spam still exists because spammers still exist.
 

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